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Abstract
This paper introduces the new pragmatic concept of Nested Presuppositions (NestPs) and develops a rele-
vance-theoretic account that explains its cognitive dynamics and manipulative mechanisms.  The first sec-
tion lays necessary theoretical foundations, by defining pragmatic presupposition, compiling a taxo nomy of 
the types of presupposition and their triggers, identifying and critiquing research gaps in eight of the most 
relevant studies and drawing the conclusion that none of the existing definitions or accounts of pragmatic 
presupposition can adequately capture the manipulative characteristics and mechanisms of the instances 
of informative presupposition at issue.  In section two, I shall introduce the concept of NestPs as the filler 
of those gaps, grounding it in Textual Rhetoric and Relevance Theory and highlighting its defining char-
acteristic of information structures, i.e. how the message is segmented and its degrees of prominence 
and suppression are assigned in order to achieve strategic goals.  I further problematize the relationship 
between NestPs, on the one hand, and informativeness and manipulation, on the other, in light of Gricean 
and Relevance-Theoretic linguistics, establishing that NestPs are inherently manipulative.  I finally expound 
the manipulative dynamics of NestPs, in terms of the information processing mechanisms they employ, by 
capitalizing on the concepts of Ostensive Stimulus, Cognitive Principle of Relevance, Principle of Optimal 
Relevance and Comprehension Procedure, and suggesting the two new mechanisms of Cognitive Underpassing 
and Structure-Content Cognitive Conflict.
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1 Introduction
This paper introduces the new pragmatic 
concept of Nested Presuppositions (hence-
forth NestPs) and develops a relevance-the-
oretic account that explains its cognitive 
dynamics and manipulative mechanisms. 
The first section is a literature review that 
outlines some competing definitions of 
pragmatic presupposition, compiles a 
taxonomy of the types of pragmatic pre-
supposition and their triggers, discusses 
five of the key (problematic) properties of 
presupposition and establishes the need 
for NestPs by identifying and critiquing 
research gaps in eight of the most rele-
vant studies in the field. In the second 
section, I shall introduce the new concept 
of NestPs, ground it in Textual Rhetoric 
and Relevance Theory, define it in terms 
of information structuring and packaging 
and elucidate my definition, with three il-
lustrative examples, two of which are put 
to the classical tests of pragmatic presup-
position. In section three, I sketch a cog-
nitive account that explains the manipu-
lative dynamics and functions of NestPs, 
in terms of the four relevance-theoretic 
concepts of Ostensive Stimulus, Cognitive 
Principle of Relevance, Principle of Opti-
mal Relevance and Comprehension Pro-
cedure, as well as the two newly suggested 
mechanisms of Cognitive Underpassing 
and Structure- Content Cognitive Conflict. I 
conclude with some recommendations for 
further research. 
2 Literature Review
2.1 What is pragmatic presupposition?
Although the literature on presupposi-
tion almost exceeds that written on any 
other topic in Pragmatics, a great deal of 
https://doi.org/10.24434/j.scoms.2019.01.003
© 2019, the authors. This work is licensed under the “Creative Commons Attribution – 
NonCommercial – NoDerivatives 4.0 International” license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
26 Maziad / Studies in Communication Sciences 19.1 (2019), pp. 25–44
it is “obsolete and sterile” (Levinson 1983: 
167), and has failed to reach a consensus 
on even a definition or a set of defining 
properties (Peccei 1999: 19). Aspects of 
disagreement include whether presup-
position is a relation between sentences, 
statements or speakers and assumptions 
(Frege 1892; Strawson 1950; 1952); wheth-
er the locus of presupposition is speakers, 
sentences or both (Keenan 1971; Brown  & 
Yule 1983; Levinson 1983; Yule 1996; Si-
mons 2003; Richardson 2007; Stalnaker 
2011); and whether presupposition refers 
to a specific homogenous phenomenon 
or a range of heterogeneous phenomena 
(Levinson 1983; Green 1989; Huang 2007). 
These competing views have yielded many 
conflicting definitions of presupposition, 
each tackling it from a different perspec-
tive. 
One of the most comprehensive defi-
nitions of presupposition is that proposed 
by Stalnaker (1972: 387–8) in which he 
argues that to “presuppose a proposition 
in the pragmatic sense is to take its truth 
for granted, and to presume that others 
involved in the context do the same.” He 
recast this definition, two years later, in the 
following Grice-like formula: 
A proposition P is a pragmatic presupposition 
of a speaker in a given context just in case the 
speaker assumes or believes that P, assumes 
or believes that his addressee assumes or be-
lieves that P, and assumes or believes that his 
addressee recognizes that he is making these 
assumptions, or has these beliefs. (1974: 473) 
The importance of the conditions of sin-
cerity and cooperation, which Stalnaker 
foregrounded in the second definition, are 
also underscored by Verschueren (1999) 
who confirms that for an utterance to be 
meaningful and successful, its presup-
posed propositions must be shared as 
common knowledge by both the speaker 
and the hearer. 
2.2 Types of presupposition and 
presuppositional triggers 
In spite of their disagreement on a defini-
tion of presupposition, researchers ha ve 
agreed on identifying some prototypical ex-
amples that represent the different types of 
presupposition and their presuppositional 
triggers, the latter being the lin guistic “in-
ducers” or “clues” used to com municate the 
meaning implied in a pre supposition. 
Out of the thirty-one types of presup-
positional triggers “isolated” by Karttunen 
(1973; 1974), Levinson selected only thir-
teen and considered them “the core of the 
phenomena that are generally considered 
presuppositional”: definite descriptions, 
factive verbs, implicative verbs, change of 
state verbs, iterative verbs, verbs of judg-
ing, temporal clauses, cleft sentences, 
implicit clefts with stressed constituents, 
comparisons and contrasts, non-restric-
tive relative clauses, counterfactual condi-
tionals, and questions (1983: 184).
There are less comprehensive classifi-
cations of presuppositional triggers: Short 
(1989) classified them into existential, lin-
guistic and pragmatic; Yule (1996) catego-
rized them into existential, factive, lexical, 
structural, non-factive and counter-factu-
al and Maingueneau (1996) reduced them 
to two broad categories of presuppositions 
triggered by linguistic structures and pre-
suppositions triggered by the relation be-
tween utterance and context. 
There has not been yet an exhaustive 
list of all the types of presupposition and 
their triggers. Table 1 is a compilation of all 
the types and triggers provided by Levin-
son (1983), Yule (1996) and Huang (2007).
2.3 (Problematic) Properties of 
informative presupposition
2.3.1 Common ground
Common Ground refers to “what is taken 
by the speaker to be the common ground of 
the participants in the conversation, what 
is treated as their common knowledge or 
mutual knowledge” (Stalnaker 1978: 321). 
It is thus one of the two basic conditions 
required for establishing presupposition: 
an “utterance A pragmatically presuppos-
es a proposition B iff A is appropriate only 
if B is mutually known by participants” 
(Levinson 1983: 205). Common ground is 
typically associated with “participant-old” 
information, i. e. information that belongs 
to the set of common beliefs, values and 
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Table 1: Types of presupposition and presuppositional triggers 
Type Presuppositional Trigger Details Example
Specific  
existential
–Definite descriptions
–Definite noun phrases, a definite article, de-
monstrative, possessive pronoun or s-genitive 
followed by a noun phrase, or a proper noun
Presupposition of existence; speaker commits  
to the existence of the named entity
John saw the 
Unidentified 
Flying Object
Structural/ 
Non-specific 
existential
–WH-questions –Certain linguistic structures are regularly and 
conventionally analysed as presupposing that 
some part of the structure is already true
–When did you 
last hit your 
wife?–Cleft, or 
–pseudo-cleft sentences
–was/wasn’t 
John who 
kissed Mary.
–what John lost 
was/wasn’t his 
wallet
–Implicit clefts with stressed constituents –Linguistics was/wasn’t invented by CHOMSKY
–John did/didn’t 
compete in the 
OLYMPICS
Factive –Factive emotive verbs  
Example: regret, be sorry, be glad, be sad that, 
be proud that, be indifferent
–The information following certain verb phrases 
is treated as fact.
–Indicates emotional attitude towards fact.
–I regretted 
telling him the 
name of my 
friend
–Indicates knowledge of fact
–Factive epistemic/Cognitive factive verbs, Ex-
ample: realize, know, be aware of, be obvious
Non-factive –Non-factive verbs 
Example: believe, suppose, pretend, imagine, 
dream, claim
–The information following certain verb phrases 
is treated as untrue.
–He claimed that 
I was driving 
fast
Counterfactual –Counterfactual conditionals –The information presented is presupposed to be 
the opposite of what is true.
–If I had been 
driving fast, 
I might have 
crashed
Lexical/Other –Implicative verbs 
Example: manage, forget to, happen, avoid, 
happened to
–The use of a particular expression is taken to 
presuppose another unstated concept.
–I managed to 
drive fast
–Aspectual/Change-of-state verbs 
Example: stop, begin, start, continue, carry on, 
cease, take, leave, enter, come, go, arrive
–Iteratives (adverbs and verbs) Example: again, 
any more, return, repeat, another time, to come 
back, restore, for the nth time
–Temporal clauses 
Example: subordinate clauses beginning with 
when, before, while, since, after, during, 
whenever, as  
–Marked by stress/other prosodic means
–Marked by particles, e. g. too, back, in return
–Marked by comparative constructions
–I stopped driving 
fast
–Verbs of Judging 
Example: accuse, criticise –The Proto-Harrappans, who flourished 2800–
2650 B.C., were/were not great temple builders
–When I drove 
fast, I skidded
–Comparisons and contrasts
–Non-restrictive relative clauses
–Marianne called 
Adolph a male 
chauvinist, then 
HE insulted HER
–Carol is/isn’t a 
better linguist 
than Barbara
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knowledge shared by both interlocutors 
and is consistent with the “pre-construct-
ed” propositions assumed as “context” 
(Stalnaker 1978; Gazdar 1979; Levinson 
1983; Fairclough 1995; Chapman & Rout-
ledge 1999).
In spite of this consensus on the im-
portance of Common Ground in pragmat-
ic presupposition, I consider it problem-
atic because, as I will explain in detail in 
section 5, NestPs do not always commu-
nicate common ground, participant-old 
knowledge.
2.3.2 Informative presupposition and 
presuppositional accommodation
This stipulation that the information car-
ried by pragmatic presupposition has to 
be participant-old is challenged by the 
counter-argument that presuppositions 
have “informative” usages: when the pre-
supposed utterance introduces partici-
pant-new information not shared by the 
hearer, and imposes an adjustment on 
their common ground (Karttunnen 1974; 
Lewis 1979; Gauker 1997; 1998). This infor-
mative aspect of presupposition is formu-
lated in the Accommodation Rule, accord-
ing to which listeners “accommodate” the 
new presupposed information by fitting it 
into the background they share with the 
speaker: 
If at time t something is said that requires pre-
supposition P to be acceptable and if P is not 
presupposed just before t, then – ceteris pari-
bus and within certain limits – presupposition 
P comes into existence at t. (Lewis 1979: 340)
Accommodation Rule was criticised as 
being no more than a formulation of the 
problem, rather than an explanation of, or 
a solution to, it (Gauker 1997; Sbisà 1999). 
Figure 1 is a tentative schematic re pre-
sentation of presuppositional accommo-
dation.
2.3.3 Constancy under negation 
Constancy Under Negation is the property 
by which the presupposition of a sta te ment 
survives negation and remains “con stant” 
and “effective”. Although it is con sidered 
one of the defining properties of presuppo-
sition (Yule 1996; Verschueren 1999; Huang 
2007), some scholars contend that it “is not 
in fact a rich enough definition to pick out a 
coherent, homogeneous set of inferences” 
(Levinson 1983: 185) and suggest replacing 
it with Defeasibility as “one of the crucial 
properties of presuppositional behaviour 
and one of the touchstones against which 
all theories of presupposition have to be as-
sessed” (ibid: 186).
2.3.4 Defeasibility
Defeasibility is the “cancellation” or “evap-
oration” of presupposition (Levinson 1983; 
Huang 2007), which can arise in different 
scenarios and contexts, e. g. “immediate 
linguistic contexts” or “less immediate dis-
course contexts” (1983: 186). The contexts 
most relevant for the scope of this paper 
are when presuppositions contradict real- 
world knowledge, prevailing background 
assumptions, implicatures and (or) imme-
diate inter- and (or) intra-sentential con-
texts. 
2.3.5 Projection 
Some linguistic expressions and environ-
ments are argued to allow presuppositions 
embedded in complex sentences to “pass 
up” or “project up” from their lower-level 
embedded phrase to the higher level of 
the whole sentence. The “complementiz-
able predicates” that allow such a projec-
tion are called “holes”, those that block it 
“plugs” and the intermediate ones “filters” 
(Karttunen 1973: 173-8). When embedded 
presuppositions fail to survive at the lev-
el of the complex sentence, the Projection 
Figure 1: Schematic representation of  
presuppositional accommodation
Interlocutors’ Common
 Ground at Time T & +P
Speaker
Hearer
Interlocutors’ Enlarged
 Common Ground at T & +P
Presupposition Informative  Presupposition 
Speaker
Hearer
Presuppositional 
Accomodation
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Problem (PP) arises. PP was accepted by 
some scholars, based on the Fregian com-
positional view that the overall meaning 
of an expression is a function of the to-
tal sum meaning of its parts (Yule 1996: 
30), and rejected by others because of its 
vagueness and inadequacy to determine 
“which presuppositions of component 
clauses will […] be inherited by the com-
plex whole” (Levinson 1983: 191).
2.4 Relevant literature on informative 
presupposition 
This section reviews and critiques eight of 
the most relevant studies to informative 
presupposition: Sbisà (1999) which high-
lights the persuasive and ideological uses 
of informative presupposition, Simons 
(2003, 2004) which ground informative 
presupposition in the cognitive sphere 
of Relevance Theory, de Saussure (2012) 
which attempts to explain presupposition 
in terms of Relevance Theory, and Capone 
(2017a, 2017b) and Macagno and Capone 
(2016a, 2016b) which fine-tune and devel-
op the concept of common ground.
First, the ideological and persuasive 
usages of informative presupposition are 
highlighted by Sbisà, who draws the con-
clusion that informative presupposition 
serves a persuasive function and acts as 
a convenient carrier and transmitter of 
ideological content “when what is pre-
supposed has to do with values, social 
norms or ideals, or with perspectives on 
facts which are proper to a specific social 
agent” (1999: 492). She further contends 
that these ideological and persuasive uses 
of informative presupposition cannot be 
explained adequately in terms of the con-
cept of Presuppositional Accommodation 
(PA) with its binary distinction between 
presupposition proper and informative 
presupposition. The existence of many 
gradual and subtle distinctions between 
these two poles of PA, she argues, render 
the concept incapable of capturing the 
complicated processes involved in so-
cial communication. Sbisà thus suggests 
allowing presuppositions a “normative 
feature”, by treating them “not as shared 
assumptions, but as assumptions which 
ought to be shared,” because the persua-
sive use of presupposition is contingent 
upon the specific “normative or deontic 
features that presuppositional phenome-
na have” (ibid: 500).
Some questions were left unanswered 
by the important study of Sbisà (1999). For 
example, is it very practical to consider 
all the persuasive uses of presupposition 
communicative in the manner Sbisà did? 
When to consider informative presuppo-
sition persuasive and when to consider 
it manipulative? Under which of the five 
cases of the “supposedly shared status of 
presuppositions”, listed by Sbisà (p. 498), 
are we to subsume the case of exploiting 
informative presupposition strategical-
ly in order to achieve manipulative goals, 
i. e. when the speaker does not hold the 
presupposed assumption and knows that 
the hearer does not hold it either, because 
the presupposed assumption is itself not 
satisfied by the “objective context”; nev-
ertheless, the speaker presupposes the 
assumption in order to deliberately ma-
nipulate the hearer? Finally, does not the 
assumption that “we should not give sep-
arate accounts of presupposition proper 
and informative or persuasive presuppo-
sition” (ibid: 499), upon which Sbisà bases 
her argument, seem not to attribute due 
weight to the important factor of inten-
tionality, without which Pragmatics would 
not function properly? 
Secondly, a quantum leap in the inves-
tigation of presupposition was made by Si-
mons (2003; 2004) who criticised previous 
semantic and pragmatic accounts of pre-
supposition as mere “descriptive character-
izations” and re-oriented the topic in Rele-
vance Theory: defining the presuppositions 
of an utterance as the “propositions which 
the addressee must accept in order for the 
Figure 2: Message segmentation in NestPs
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utterance to be relevant for her in the way 
intended by the speaker” (2003: 256). 
Simons based her argument on Rel-
evance theory, maintaining that the rel-
evance of an utterance can lead to its ac-
ceptance as a presupposition. The most 
relevant proposition, i. e. the one inducing 
the principal contextual effect, is the stron-
gest proposition that will be foregrounded 
in the utterance and treated as the maxi-
mal proposition. Any other propositions 
will be backgrounded and dealt with as 
secondary “non-maximal entailments”. 
Pre suppositions arise, Simons contends, 
when the acceptance of the backgrounded 
propositions becomes a prerequisite for 
the acceptance of the maximal entailment. 
Presupposition is thus viewed as a rele-
vance requirement and presuppositions as 
propositions required for establishing rel-
evance, either by being part of the context 
of the hearer or by being communicated 
as new but non-main-point propositions 
that are not the principal carriers of rele-
vance (2004: 329–55). 
Simons (2003; 2004) made a contribu-
tion to the investigation of presupposition 
by tackling it from a cognitive perspective, 
but offered no explanation of the cog nitive 
mechanisms involved in the relevance- 
theoretic presupposition or the manipu-
lative potential of pragmatic presupposi-
tion.
Thirdly, the relevance-theoretic inves-
tigation of presupposition is further de-
veloped by de Saussure who defines pre-
suppositions as “contents brought about 
by an utterance as pre-conditions not to 
meaning but to relevance” (2012: 38). He 
explains presupposition in terms of the 
“economy of information processing”: 
employing the “Minimax Scales”, i. e. the 
rules of minimising costs and maximising 
effects, to organize the cognitive process-
es involved in natural language process-
ing (ibid: 39). De Saussure contends that 
since presuppositions are “incorporated 
in the cognitive environment of the hear-
er as preconditions to relevance,” they are 
“shallowly processed”, i. e. not subjected to 
discussion, critical evaluation or controls 
and filters of relevance (ibid: 47). 
Although de Saussure (2012) develops 
a plausible cognitive account of presup-
position, his treatment of presupposi-
tions as “contents” seems to disregard the 
important role played by structure. This 
represents a real problem in NestPs which, 
as will be explained in detailed in the fol-
lowing section, are primarily manipulative 
because they disguise unshared, new-in-
formation “contents” and present them as 
presupposed, old-information contents, 
by carrying the former in structures typi-
cally associated with the latter and attack-
ing the short-term and working memories 
of the hearer with multiple such struc-
tures. Presuppositions thus do not nec-
essarily operate as old-information “con-
tents” only, but also as cognitively taxing 
information structures.
Fourthly, the analysis of presuppo-
sition has been developed by Capone 
(2017a, 2017b) and Macagno and Capone 
(2016a, 2016b) who enriched it with new 
linguistic and argumentative perspectives 
and finetuned its central concept of com-
mon ground.
Linguistically, they grounded their 
approach on the theory of Polyphony (Du-
crot 1984, a cited in Macagno & Capone 
2016a) which distinguishes different voic-
es, assertions, and commitments within 
an utterance: an utterance may deploy a 
polyphony of conflicting voices arranged 
in complex structures of direct and indi-
rect reports whose enunciators can be dis-
tinguished distinctively and held responsi-
ble for different implicit speech acts. The 
analysis of Macagno and Capone (2016a) 
is based on the two interrelated concepts 
of presumptions and commitments: it 
maintains that pragmatic presupposition 
is mainly based on common ground and 
possible accommodation, and explains 
the problematic relationship between pre-
supposition triggers and pragmatic pre-
suppositions in terms of the presumptive 
and non-presumptive polyphonic artic-
ulations of an utterance and the distinct 
commitments that ensue for the interloc-
utors.  
The presumptive, polyphonic inter-
pretation of an utterance distinguishes be-
tween two or more utterers: a first utterer, 
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i.e. the speaker, and a voice representing 
a common opinion. The non-presump-
tive, polyphonic articulation consists of a 
free indirect report, in which the utterer 
reports the presuppositions indirectly by 
attributing them to a second voice that 
belongs to the speech community of the 
hearer.
When the presumed commitments 
deriving from the presumptive interpre-
tation of an utterance conflict with its 
presumable stronger ones, the polyphony 
of the utterance is renegotiated, i.e. the 
utterance is no longer interpreted, pre-
sumptively, as expressing the point of view 
of the speaker, but, non-presumptively, 
as consisting of two or more voices: one 
stating the viewpoint of the speaker and 
the other(s) indirectly reporting another 
view point that the speaker does not hold 
as his/her commitments. That non-pre-
sumptive modification of the presumptive 
structure of an utterance distances the 
speaker from the presupposed proposi-
tions, treats them as quoted elements of 
discourse that do not result in any respon-
sibility for the speaker, and hence does not 
hold the latter responsible for them. That 
polyphonic articulation of the implicit di-
alogical dimension of an utterance and its 
underlying structures can explain cases in 
which semantic presupposition triggers 
do not result in pragmatic presupposi-
tions, i.e. the phenomena of presupposi-
tion suspension which arise when there 
is a discrepancy between the presumptive 
reading of an utterance and its non-pre-
sumptive meaning.
Capone et al. explained those phe-
nomena of presupposition suspension as 
cases of non-presumptive, non-prototyp-
ical interpretation of utterances, whose 
presumptive, prototypical reading had 
failed to reconstruct the communicative 
intention of the speaker. Such a failure 
triggers a non-defaultive reading of the ut-
terance, modifies its prototypical polypho-
ny, allows the speaker to metalinguistically 
refuse the commitments resulting from 
the other voice(s), and initiates a non-au-
tomatic, complex mechanism of meaning 
explanation that aims at reconstructing 
the illocutionary force of the utterance, 
retrieving the logical form of the proposi-
tion, and ultimately establishing the com-
municative intention of the speaker. 
That process of reconstructing the 
pra g matic structure of the utterance, 
which Capone et al. called reasoning from 
best interpretation, can be considered as 
an abductive pattern of microargumen-
tation based on hierarchies of presump-
tions, as it involves a complex type of 
reasoning that compares, analyses, and 
weights the different possible linguistic 
and epistemic presumptions associated 
with the different interpretations of the 
expressed meaning as well as its co-textual 
and contextual information, in an attempt 
to find the best possible explanation of the 
communicative intention of the speaker. 
That interpretive reasoning process un-
derlies the automatic relevance-theoretic 
mechanism of explicature which decodes, 
reconstructs, and explicates the implicat-
ed pragmatic meaning into a proposition-
al one. 
Capone (2017a, 2017b) and Macag-
no and Capone (2016a, 2016b) therefore 
fertilized the analysis of presupposition 
argumentatively and linguistically. Argu-
mentatively, they analysed the pragmatic 
concept of “taking responsibility” for an 
utterance in terms of the argumentative 
concepts of “commitments” or “dialecti-
cal obligations”, and explained some cases 
of presupposition suspension in terms of 
the two microargumentation mechanisms 
of presumptive reasoning and reasoning 
from best argumentation. Linguistical-
ly, their presumptive/non-presumptive 
poly phonic treatment of presupposition 
ex plained some of the phenomena of pre-
supposition suspension in terms of the 
mechanism of explicature and the corre-
sponding non-presumptive reasoning un-
derlying it, allowed the reconstruction of 
the logical form of the illocutionary force 
of utterances, and accounted for the attri-
bution of the commitments of the speaker 
and the hearer and the presumptions un-
derlying it.
Nevertheless, that polyphonic treat-
ment cannot account for cases of informa-
tive presupposition in which the speaker 
reports unsubstantiated, non-common-
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ground presumptions and (or) attributes 
them to a second voice in order not to dis-
tance her/himself from them or to evade 
responsibility for them, but to commit 
both her/himself as well as the hearers to 
that presumed content, and hence ma-
nipulate the latter deliberately by passing 
that unsubstantiated presumed content 
as agreed-upon, common-ground facts, in 
an argumentative move similar to that im-
plied in the Aristotelian presumptive falla-
cy of petitio principii, i. e. presupposing a 
conclusion of an argument as its premises 
or assuming premises that are not likely 
to be known or admitted by the address-
ee (Schipper & Schuh, 1960: 55–60). The 
polyphonic treatment of presupposition, 
therefore, cannot account for the manip-
ulative instances of informative presup-
position cited in the corpus of speeches at 
issue.
3 Nested presuppositions
3.1 Theoretical framework
3.1.1 Textual Rhetoric
The newly suggested concept of NestPs is 
inspired by Textual Rhetoric (TR): “(a) how 
to segment the message into units; (b) how 
to assign degrees of prominence or subor-
dination; and (c) how to order the parts of 
the message” (Leech 1983: 64). This partic-
ular framework has been selected because 
it underscores the strategic role played by 
linguistic structures, not in their grammat-
ical sense, but in their pragmatic force, i.e. 
how they are engineered to foreground, 
hide, frame, and (or) intermediate specific 
meanings.
3.1.2 Relevance Theory 
Relevance Theory (RT) is a cognitive, psy-
chological, inferential theory of communi-
cation that aims at interpreting utterances, 
as well as any other “ostensive stimulus”, in 
terms of cognitive processes (Wilson 1998; 
Sperber & Wilson 1985, 1995, 2002; Wilson 
& Sperber 2004). RT is constructed upon 
three key concepts: The Cognitive Princi-
ple of Relevance (CGPR), the Communica-
tive Principle of Relevance (CMPR) and the 
presumption of Optimal Relevance (OR). 
CGPR states that human cognition is 
“geared to the maximisation of relevance” 
(Wilson & Sperber 2004: 249), and CMPR 
assumes that every “ostensive stimulus 
conveys a presumption of its own optimal 
relevance” (ibid: 254). CMPR is thus based 
on the CGPR and the Gricean concept of 
Inferential Communication (IC) which 
con siders communication “a process of in-
ferential intention attribution” (ibid: 254). 
Wilson & Sperber added an extra layer of 
intention to IC and called it Ostensive In-
ferential Communication (OIC), contend-
ing that it involves “a. The informative 
intention: The intention to inform an au-
dience of something, [and] b. The commu-
nicative intention: The intention to inform 
the audience of one’s informative inten-
tion” (ibid: 255). While the fulfilment of the 
communicative intention is a prerequisite 
for understanding, the fulfilment of the 
informative intention depends on wheth-
er the audience trusts the communicator 
or not, a condition not necessary for mere 
recognition. Every act of OIC is based on 
the use of an Ostensive Stimulus (OS): a 
stimulus intentionally designed to attract 
the attention of the audience and focus it 
on the meaning intended by the commu-
nicator; consequently, it is more capable 
than any other stimulus of generating 
“precise and predictable” anticipations of 
relevance (ibid: 255). 
The third key concept in RT is the 
presumption of Optimal Relevance (OR) 
which regulates the effort-effect balance:
1) An ostensive stimulus is optimally rele-
vant to an audience iff: 
 a. It is relevant enough to be worth the 
audience’s processing effort; 
 b. It is the most relevant one compatible 
with the communicator’s abilities and 
preferences (ibid: 256). 
Finally, RT suggests a comprehension pro-
cedure for testing and constructing hypoth-
eses about the meaning intended by the 
speaker, based on CGPR and OR. The in-
ferential comprehension procedure, which 
applies at both the explicit and implicit lev-
els, i. e. for the identification of explicated 
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content and explicatures, and the recovery 
of implicatures, directs the hearer to: 
2) a. Follow a path of least effort in com-
puting cognitive effects: Test interpre-
tive hypotheses (disambiguations, ref-
erence resolutions, implicatures, etc.) 
in order of accessibility.
 b. Stop when your expectations of rele-
vance are satisfied (ibid: 259). 
3.1.3 Definition of NestPs 
NestPs are cognitively taxing informa-
tion structures which nest several layers 
of participant-new-information contents 
(NI) that are ideological, unshared by the 
hearer and not satisfied by the objective 
context; take their truth value for granted; 
build upon them; and package them in 
linguistic structures that are typically as-
sociated with participant-old information 
(OI), in order to deliberately manipulate 
the hearer. 
In other words, NestPs are difficult-
to- process information structures that are 
strategically devised to carry, flash, then 
hide several propositions that are neither 
substantiated nor shared by the hearer. 
Nevertheless, the speaker presents those 
Figure 3: Example of the information structures of NestPs
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NI contents as true, OI, common know-
ledge and tactically casts them in linguistic 
structures associated with shared OI, in or-
der to implicitly sell them to the hearer in a 
manipulative linguistic transaction. More-
over, NestPs are manipulative not only be-
cause they disguise NI in the form of OI by 
carrying the former in structures typically 
associated with the latter, but also because 
NestPs attack the cognitive system of the 
hearer with multiple such structures at 
the same time, which results in cramming 
the short-term and working memories 
of the hearers, dissipating their process-
ing capacities, and preventing them from 
evaluating the presupposed propositions 
properly, as will be explained in detail in 
the following section. 
3.2 Information structures (IS)  
and packaging in NestPs 
The structuring of information in NestPs 
can be best illustrated through an authen-
tic example. Following is an extract from 
the first speech delivered by the ousted 
President of Tunisia Zine El Abidine ben 
Ali, on 27 December 2010, in response to 
the Arab Spring Jasmine Revolt in Tunisia: 
 › Example (1): While we have achieved 
outstanding results in the field of edu-
cation, qualitatively and quantitative-
ly, which received appreciation and 
recognition from specialized interna-
tional and UN-affiliated bodies, this in-
deed signifies a constant, fundamental 
choice in our policy of building an edu-
cated nation. 
In terms of message segmentation, the nu-
clear constituent of NestPs is the Core (C), 
which corresponds in Example (1) to the 
proposition “we have achieved outstand-
ing results”. The Core is the most dubious 
and problematic proposition in a NestPs 
construct; it does not have a truth value, 
nor does it constitute a common ground. 
That is the reason why the speaker tactical-
ly buries the Core as deeply as possible at 
the bottom of NestPs, as visually illustrated 
in Figures (2) and (3). All the subsequent 
presumptive additions can be thought of 
as propositional Layers (L#) accumulated 
to cover the dubious Core, by pushing it 
further back, far from the active process-
ing of the Focus of Attention (FOA). Those 
layers also act as post-modifiers that take 
the truth value of the Core for granted and 
build upon it. In Example (1), those are 
L1, L2, L3, L4, and L5. The highest layer 
of NestPs is called the Top Surface Layer 
(TSL). Since it is the last proposition the 
hearer receives and hence the most active 
in her/his FOA, TSL needs to have unprob-
lematic content. In Example (1), TSL cor-
responds to “building an educated nation”. 
In terms of packaging, the two main 
strategies of NestPs for assigning degrees 
of prominence and (or) subordination 
to constituent presuppositions is fore-
grounding and (or) backgrounding, re-
spectively. The core, being the most du-
bious proposition, is assigned the least 
possible degree of prominence by being 
buried inside multiple embedded presup-
positions and consequently background-
ed and relegated to the back of attention 
and processing. On the other hand, the 
TSL which constitutes an unproblema-
tic part of the common knowledge of the 
speaker and the hearer is foregrounded 
and fronted to attention, processing, and 
evaluation. As Figure (3) illustrates, gra-
dation in colour and font refers to the dif-
ferent Layers of presuppositions nested 
deliberately to background the Core and 
foreground the TSL.
3.3 Illustrative example of NestPs
Following is a longer and more illustra-
tive example of NestPs, extracted from the 
same speech of ousted President ben Ali: 
 › Example (2): While the trigger of these 
events was one social case, whose cir-
cumstances and psychological fac-
tors we understand, we feel sorry for 
the damages that resulted from those 
events and took exaggerated dimen-
sions, due to the political exploitation 
of some parties who do not want the 
good for their homeland, and resort to 
some foreign television channels that 
are hostile to Tunisia and broadcast lies 
and fallacies without scrutiny, adopting 
exaggeration, incitation and media def-
amation, all these call upon us to clari-
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fy some issues and confirm some facts 
that should not be overlooked.1 
The Core of this twelve-Layer NestPs is the 
Specific Existential presupposition trigge-
red by the definite NP (Demonstrative + N) 
which assumes that “›there exist events”. 
Here, the ousted President of Tunisia is 
employing presupposition ideologically 
and manipulatively, not only to present 
his view as a taken-for-granted common 
ground, but also to build upon it. He is 
1 The quote might sound awkward in English, 
because I retained the original Arabic struc-
ture of the utterance in the English trans la-
tion. 
reducing the Revolution of the Tunisian 
people to mere “events”, attributing those 
“events” to a single “one social case” which 
he considered unworthy of explication 
and employing the thickest type of impli-
cature, i. e. Particularized Implicature, to 
implicate that “one social case” and gloss 
over it in a vague manner. 
That “one social case” which ben Ali 
implicated was the 26-year-old Tunisian 
man Tarek al-Tayeb Muhammad Bouazizi, 
who was supporting his family by selling 
fruit and vegetables, until a policewoman 
confiscated his cart, slapped him in the 
face and beat him up when he objected. 
Bouazizi went to the police station and 
Table 2: Detailed analysis of the constituent presuppositions of NestPs in example (2)
Utterance Presuppositional trigger Presupposition Type of presuppo-
sition
1 These events Definite NP (Demonstrative + N) ››There exist events; Specific Existential 
2 The trigger Definite NP (definite article + N)
Temporal Clause (While + NP)
››There exists a trigger of these events;  Specific Existential
3 whose circumstanc-
es and psychological 
factors we under-
stand
Possessive relative pronoun 
“whose”
Factive epistemic verb  
“understand”
››That trigger has circumstances and 
psychological factors;
››We understand the afore-mentioned 
circumstances and factors;
Specific Existential
Factive Epistemic
4
5
Feel sorry about 
the damages that 
resulted 
Factive emotive verb  
“feel sorry”
››The above-mentioned events resulted in 
damages
››We feel sorry for those damages
Factive emotive
and took exaggerat-
ed dimensions
Change-of-state verb  
“exaggerate”
››those damages were exaggerated Other
6 due to the political 
exploitation 
Definite NP  
(definite article + NP) 
››There exists a political exploitation which 
caused the aforementioned exaggeration 
Specific Existential
7 of the situation Definite NP  
(definite article + NP) 
››There exists a situation that was  
politically exploited
Specific Existential
8 by some parties Determiner + NP
 
››There exist some parties who exploited 
that situation politically
Non-Specific Exis-
tential
9 who do not want 
the good for their 
homeland 
Relative clause ››Those parties do not want the public good 
of their country
Other
10 some foreign televi-
sion channels
Determiner + NP 
 
››There exist foreign TV channels to which 
the above-mentioned parties resort
Non-Specific Exis-
tential
11 which broadcast lies 
and fallacies
Relative clause ››There are lies and fallacies broadcast by 
those channels
Other
12 Clarify some of the 
issues and confirm 
some the facts 
that should not be 
overlooked
Factive Epistemic verbs  
“clarify & confirm”
Definite NP  
“the issues & the facts”
Relative clause 
››There exist issues
››There exist facts
››Some of those issues and facts are neither 
clear not confirmed
››Those issues and facts are overlooked
Specific Existential
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the municipal council to file a complaint 
against the policewoman, but no official 
agreed to listen to him. He then doused 
himself in paint thinner and set himself on 
fire in front of the local municipal council 
of the town of Sidi Bouzeid (Rifai 2011; de 
Rosa 2011; al-Karama Forum 2011). His 
death gave momentum to the Tunisian 
revolution which ousted ben Ali twen-
ty-eight days later and triggered the domi-
no effect of the Arab Spring revolutions in 
Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. 
In the following Layers of NestPs, the 
ousted President uses the Definite NP 
(Definite article  + N) together with the 
Tem poral Clause (While  + NP) to trigger 
the specific existential presupposition 
“›The re exist a trigger of those events”. This 
presupposition performs the function of 
mitigation. 
Ben Ali then uses the Possessive Rel-
ative pronoun “whose” to trigger the Spe-
cific Existential presupposition “›There 
exist circumstances and psychological 
factors for that trigger” and follows it with 
a Factive Epistemic verb to trigger the pre-
supposition that “›We understand those 
factors”. He also uses the Factive Emotive 
verb phrase “feel sorry” to trigger the pre-
supposition that “›The events resulted in 
damages”. The last three presuppositions 
of the Ousted President act as an indirect 
acknowledgement of the problem and 
perform a reconciliatory function, sending 
the message to the revolutionaries that he 
is following the situation, knows what is 
going on and feels remorse. He then uses 
the Change-of-State verb “exaggerated” 
to trigger the presupposition that “›Those 
damages are exaggerated’”, and the Defi-
nite NP (Definite Article + NP) to trigger 
the Specific Existential presupposition 
that “›There exists a political exploitation 
which caused that exaggeration”. 
Ben Ali, then, identifies the sphere 
where exploitation happened and the 
exploiters who did it: using the Genitive 
Structure (of + NP) to trigger the Specific 
Existential presupposition “›There exists 
a situation that was politically exploited”, 
the (Determiner + NP) structure to trigger 
the Non-Specific Existential presupposi-
tion that “›There exist some parties who 
exploited the situation politically” and the 
non-restrictive Relative Clause structure 
to trigger the presupposition that “›Those 
parties do not want the public good of 
their country”. The Ousted President, 
then, uses the (Determiner + NP) structure 
to trigger the Non-Specific Existential pre-
supposition that “›There exist foreign TV 
channels” to which the aforementioned 
exploiting parties resort. He describes 
what those channels broadcast by using 
the non-restrictive Relative Clause struc-
ture to trigger the presupposition that 
“›There are lies and fallacies broadcast by 
those channels”. All the previous seven 
presuppositions perform the functions of 
attacking, defaming and demonizing op-
ponents. 
Finally, in the TSL, the Ousted Pres-
ident employs the Definite NP, the Rela-
tive Clause and the Factive Epistemic verb 
structures to trigger the Specific Existen-
tial presuppositions that “›There exist is-
sues and facts that are overlooked, not 
confirmed and not clarified”. 
NestPs were employed in this utter-
ance, by the ousted President, ideological-
ly and strategically, in order to disguise un-
substantiated, unshared propositions and 
present them as true, common-ground, 
presupposed facts. NestPs mitigated the 
political situation in Tunisia, by reduc-
ing the revolution of the whole country 
to mere “events” that were triggered by a 
single “one social case”; covered the high-
ly sensitive and mobilizing story of the 
self-immolation of Bouazizi, by dehu-
manizing him, reducing him to a “case”, 
further minimizing that case to a single 
one case, undermining the credibility of 
Bouazizi by depicting him as a mentally 
ill man; described all the revolutionaries 
as traitors conspiring with foreign media 
against their own country and legitimized 
the interference of ben Ali as the source of 
clarification. 
The ousted President used all the 
above-mentioned presupposed proposi-
tions as taken-for-granted premises and 
built upon them to legitimize himself and 
what he was doing. NestPs, in this short 
utterance, have thus performed the mul-
tiple manipulative functions of mitigation, 
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Other- dehumanisation, Other-demoniza-
tion and Self-legitimisation. 
4 NestPs as a manipulative type of 
informative presuppositions
Based on the premise that the presuppo-
sitions assuming specific propositions 
which implicitly transmit value-judge-
mental conceptions about how the world 
is and how it should be are to be considered 
ideological (Sbisà 1999: 492), NestPs are 
ideological. The fact that not all ideologi-
cal propositions are manipulative leaves 
NestPs at the crossroads of two potential 
paths: being classified as informative or as 
manipulative. This fundamental issue can 
be settled in light of the pragmatic defini-
tions of informative presupposition, the 
Gricean Maxims and Conditions of Quan-
tity, Quality, Manner and Sincerity and the 
principles of Relevance Theory. 
4.1 Pragmatic definitions of informative 
presupposition
Pragmatically speaking, Brown and Yule 
(1983) stipulate that presuppositions can 
communicate new unshared information 
if that information is neither “controver-
sial” nor “asserted”. In a similar vein, Stal-
naker states that the definition of presup-
position, in terms of common-ground, is 
valid in “normal, straightforward serious 
conversational contexts where the over-
riding purpose of the conversation is to 
exchange information” (1974: 474). None 
of these three conditions is satisfied in 
NestPs: which communicate highly con-
troversial information, in contexts that are 
far from being straightforward, for purpos-
es that have nothing to do with exchanging 
information. 
NestPs also violate two important con-
ditions specified by Stalnaker as defining 
characteristics of informative presuppo-
sition: the speaker should not “have any 
particular mental attitude towards the 
pro position” nor should they “assume 
any thing about the mental attitudes of 
others in the context” (1972: 387).  The fact 
that the speaker employs NestPs in order to 
manipulate the cognitive processing sys-
tem of the hearer entails necessarily that 
the speaker does have not only a mental 
attitude towards his presupposed propo-
sitions, but also a deliberate intent to ma-
nipulate the mental attitudes of the hearer.
4.2 Gricean maxims
In terms of Gricean pragmatics, NestPs 
vio late more than one maxim at the same 
time. They first violate the Gricean Maxim 
of Quantity, by nesting many layers of pre-
suppositions and consequently providing 
more information than required. NestPs 
also violate the Maxim of Quality, by pre-
supposing unsubstantiated propositions 
and taking their truth for granted. More-
over, NestPs violate the Maxim of Manner, 
by being neither clear, nor brief, nor or-
derly. Finally, NestPs violate the Sincerity 
Condition, as the speaker knows that the 
content of the propositions he is assuming 
is unsubstantiated and unshared by the 
hearer; nevertheless, the former strategi-
cally presupposes the propositions, as true 
and shared common knowledge, in order 
to the manipulate the latter. 
The fact that NestPs violate the prag-
matic definitions of informativeness and 
the Gricean maxims of communication 
eliminates the possibility of their being in-
formative and renders them manipulative. 
The sense of manipulation meant here is 
that defined by Rigotti as:
A message is manipulative if it twists the visi-
on of the world (physical as well as social – or 
human – actual as well as virtual) in the mind 
of the addressee, so that he/she is prevent-
ed from a healthy attitude towards decision. 
(i. e., an attitude responding to his/her very 
interest), and pursues the manipulator’s goal 
in the illusion of pursuing her/his own goal 
(2005: 68)
This definition is in line with the argument 
advanced by van Dijk that the discourse 
employed to reproduce power, exercised 
discursively in the interest of the power-
ful and against that of the powerless, is an 
ideological and manipulative discourse 
(2006: 360). 
In NestPs, the speaker commits the 
hearers to his views, provides them with 
38 Maziad / Studies in Communication Sciences 19.1 (2019), pp. 25–44
unsubstantiated information with which 
they are unlikely to agree in normal cir-
cumstances and manipulates their cogni-
tive systems in order to achieve the strate-
gic goal of maintaining unequal relations 
of power. NestPs are thus inherently ideo-
logical and manipulative.
5 Manipulative information structures 
and cognitive mechanisms of 
NestPs
The manipulation of NestPs can be pro ble-
matized and accounted for relevance-the-
oretically in terms of information structu-
res and cognitive mechanisms.
5.1 Information structures 
5.1.1 Ostensive Stimulus (OS)
An OS “conveys a presumption of its own 
optimal relevance”, i. e. it is engineered 
to behave as the strongest stimulus most 
capable of attracting the attention of a 
targeted audience and focusing it on the 
specific meaning intended by the speaker 
(Wilson & Sperber 2004: 254). In NestPs, 
the TSL functions as the OS which the 
speaker baits in order to trigger anticipa-
tions of optimal relevance in the cognitive 
systems of his audience, enticing them to 
assume that the TSL is the strongest and 
most relevant stimulus, and consequently 
the most rewarding one to process. 
The first manipulative aspect of NestPs 
thus lies in the fact that their TSL does not 
qualify for the position it occupies as the 
OS worthy of foregrounding and process-
ing. This is because the TSL is not opti-
mally relevant: it is not the most relevant 
stimulus “compatible with communica-
tor’s abilities and preferences” (ibid: 256) 
and it is not the stimulus most capable of 
generating “precise and predictable” an-
ticipations of relevance; consequently, it 
is not the strongest stimulus most worthy 
of processing. TSL is in fact a weak stim-
ulus whose positive cognitive effects do 
not compensate for the effort required for 
processing it; thus, it should not have been 
foregrounded in the position it occupies. 
5.1.2 Cognitive Principle of Relevance 
(CGPR)
NestPs are also manipulative because they 
exploit the universal tendency towards the 
maximisation of relevance, as informed by 
the CGPR, i.e. the human tendency to se-
lect the most optimally relevant stimulus 
in the environment and process it (ibid: 
249). This manipulative exploitation is also 
performed by designing the TSL to act as 
the salient OS, and foregrounding it in the 
way that most attracts the attention of the 
targeted audience and best prompts the 
retrieval of specific contextual assump-
tions that warrant yielding the exact con-
clusion intended by the speaker. NestPs 
thus do not only anticipate the cognitive 
behaviour of the targeted audience, but 
also frame, channel and direct it strategi-
cally in order to achieve specific manipu-
lative goals. 
5.1.3 Optimal Relevance (OR) 
NestPs are also manipulative because they 
violate the concept of OR, not only by their 
TSL, as explained above, but also by their 
other sub-structures. According to OR, it is 
in the best interest of the speaker, if they 
would like to communicate successfully 
with an audience, to formulate their mes-
sage in the easiest and most cognitively 
accessible, economic and consequently 
rewarding manner to that audience. The 
speaker is also obliged to substantiate any 
claims they make with the evidence nec-
essary to achieve the intended cognitive 
effects in the audience. 
NestPs do not fulfil any of these con-
ditions: The producer of NestPs tactical-
ly segments, arranges, and packages the 
message in a deliberately-convoluted 
and hard-to-process manner that back-
grounds and buries the strongest propo-
sition most worthy of processing, i. e. the 
Core, and foregrounds and assigns the 
highest degree of prominence to the weak-
est and least relevant stimulus, i. e. the 
TSL. This manipulative ordering enables 
the producer of NestPs to create a ground-
less, deceptive air of agreement with their 
audience, by hiding the most controversial 
proposition, flashing the shared one, and 
embedding, nesting, and disguising mul-
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tiple, unsubstantiated presuppositions in 
between, without establishing the truth 
values of any of them.  
5.2 Cognitive (Mis)Behaviour of NestPs 
5.2.1 Structure-content cognitive conflict 
(SCCC)
Since pragmatic presuppositions are parti-
cipant-old information shared by the in-
terlocutors, they behave cognitively as 
back grounded information that is not cur-
rently under active processing and do not 
go through the filters of relevance or the 
checks of further discussion (Simons 2004; 
von Fintel 2008; de Saussure 2012).
NestPs, on the other hand, consist 
mainly of participant-new active informa-
tion (NI) that is twisted to act as presup-
positions by being carried in structures 
associated with old-information (OI). 
This forced imposition of NI content in OI 
structures is likely to cause logical and cog-
nitive conflict in the minds of the hearers. 
This conflict, which can be termed Struc-
ture-Content Cognitive Conflict (SCCC), 
results from the situation when the old-in-
formation structures of NestPs are read-
ily classified as relevant and prepared to 
be admitted into the long-term memory, 
while their new-information contents 
are still being processed, i. e. classified as 
new, disambiguated, explicated, inferen-
tially resolved, checked for reconciliation 
against their old-information structures, 
etc., and ultimately classified as irrelevant. 
Figure (4) attempts to depict this SCCC vi-
sually.
Figure 4: Structure-content cognitive conflict in NestPs
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Resolving this SCCC is cognitively ta-
x ing, in terms of the processing efforts 
it consumes at the expense of the overall 
pro cessing capacity. SCCC thus causes 
a deficiency in the cognitive processing 
ca pacity of the hearer, which in turn in-
capacitates their cognitive checks, filters 
and controls allowing the unsubstantiated 
propositions and implausible arguments 
carried by NestPs to bypass those checks 
and filters and be admitted into the long-
term memory.
5.2.2 Minimum effort path (MEP) 
According to clause (b) of the definition of 
OR in [1], the speaker is expected to formu-
late their message in the easiest way their 
audience can understand. On the other 
end of the OIC situation, the hearer is en-
titled to follow a path of minimum effort 
and to stop processing upon reaching the 
first plausible interpretation that satisfies 
their expectations of relevance, as suggest-
ed by clauses (a) and (b) of the compre-
hension procedure in [2] (Wilson  & Sper-
ber 2004: 256–259). Moreover, given the 
inverse relationship between relevance 
and effort in RT, the first and most easily 
constructed interpretation is most likely 
to enjoy the status of optimal relevance, 
because the speaker is expected to have 
cooperated and formulated his utterance 
in such an easy way that the first interpre-
tation to strike the cognitive effort-effect 
balance, in the hearer, is to be deemed the 
one intended by the supposedly coopera-
tive speaker. 
In violation of clause (b) of the defi-
nition of OR in [1], the producer of NestPs 
tactically formulates their message in a 
complex and difficult-to-process manner: 
embedding many presuppositions in a 
large, deep nest; disguising and wrapping 
NI in the structures of OI; reversing the 
order of accessibility by backgrounding 
the strong stimulus, foregrounding the 
weak ones, and forcing the latter to func-
tion as an OS; and taking the truth value 
of many unsubstantiated propositions for 
granted and building upon them. On the 
other hand, the hearer of NestPs innocent-
ly follows the minimum effort path (MEP), 
by testing interpretive hypotheses in their 
order of accessibility and stopping when 
his expectations of relevance are satisfied, 
driven by good faith in the expectation 
that the speaker had observed clause (b) 
of OR and formulated his message in the 
easiest and most accessible way. 
As a result of these cooperatively and 
sincerely incompatible approaches adopt-
ed by the producer and the consumer of 
NestPs, the comprehension procedure in 
NestPs does not proceed as smoothly as 
informed and anticipated by RT. MEP fails 
to lead the hearer to construct relevant, 
anticipatory interpretive hypotheses that 
satisfy the expectations of relevance raised 
by the utterance itself, which imposes 
an extra processing load on the already 
strained cognitive processing system, that 
has been making hard attempts to solve 
the SCCC, and consequently dissipating 
more processing efforts and resources of 
the overall processing capacity of the hear-
er. This MEP failure, exacerbated by the 
waste of processing capacity caused by the 
SCCC, renders the cognitive system of the 
hearer vulnerable to what I call the process 
of Cognitive Underpassing.  
5.2.3 Cognitive Underpassing (CU) 
Cognitive Underpassing (CU) can be 
thought of as the total sum result of many 
factors that have joined forces to ham-
per the proper cognitive processing of 
the hearer: foregrounding the weak and 
non-optimally relevant TSL and back-
grounding the strong and optimally rel-
evant C; creating a cognitive conflict by 
casting NI propositional content in OI 
structures; accumulating many layers of 
finer nested presuppositions the testing 
and construction of whose interpretative 
hypotheses require complex, cognitively 
taxing processing; taking the truth value 
of those nested presuppositions for grant-
ed and building upon them without sub-
stantiation; attacking the cognitive system 
of the hearer with a large number of those 
presuppositions; manipulating the OR ef-
fort-effect formula by reversing the order 
of accessibility to the nested propositions; 
failing to establish relevance through the 
MEP; and wasting many processing efforts 
in resolving the SCCC. All these factors 
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combined together can result in a process-
ing overload which strains the cognitive 
processing capacity of the hearer, renders 
it incapable of performing any further 
proper processing, and allows unsubstan-
tiated claims and propositions to bypass 
Relevance Checking Controls and filters 
and to be accepted as relevant.
In other words, this Cognitive Under-
passing process takes place when the pro-
cessing capacity of the hearer fails to han-
dle the cognitive processing load caused 
by (1) the information structures, (2) the 
fallacious contents, and (3) the cognitive 
behaviour of NestPs, as visually illustrated 
in Figure (5). As a result, the Short-Term 
Memory and the Working Memory get 
gradually crammed and overstrained, un-
til no processing capacity is left to check 
or verify incoming presuppositions. It 
is at that point that the Layers of NestPs 
take advantage of their structure, as al-
ready-relevant, low-cost, effect-produc-
ing, old-information, in order to bypass 
the truth/falsity and relevance-checking 
controls of the hearer and get admitted 
into their Long-Term Memory, as presup-
posed, checked, relevant propositions, 
with substantiated truth value.
To sum up, and based on the defini-
tion developed by Leech (1983: 60) that a 
“textually ‘well-behaved’ utterance being 
one which anticipate and facilitate H’s [the 
hearer’s] task in decoding, or making sense 
Figure 5: Cognitive underpassing in NestPs
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of, the text”, NestPs are linguistically, prag-
matically, and cognitively misbehaved ut-
terances: they are strategically engineered 
to manipulate the cognitive processing 
systems of the hearers. Manipulation is 
therefore an inherent characteristic of the 
propositional content, information struc-
tures, cognitive behaviour, and pragmatic 
functions of NestPs. It can be thus confi-
dently concluded that NestPs are a ma-
nipulative form of informative presuppo-
sition. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has introduced the new prag-
matic concept of NestPs and sketched a 
relevance-theoretic account that explains 
its manipulative character and dynam-
ics, in terms of its information structures, 
contents and cognitive processing mech-
anisms. 
The paper began by laying some nec-
essary theoretical foundations: exploring 
different approaches to pragmatic pre-
supposition, compiling a taxonomy of the 
types of presupposition and their triggers, 
discussing some of the most problemat-
ic properties of pragmatic presupposi-
tion and situating the proposed concept 
of NestPs in the wider context of current 
pragmatic theory, by identifying and cri-
tiquing research gaps in four of the most 
relevant studies in the field. A conclu-
sion was drawn that none of the existing 
definitions of pragmatic presupposition 
can adequately capture the manipulative 
characteristics and mechanisms of NestPs. 
The two theoretical frameworks of Textu-
al Rhetoric and Relevance Theory, within 
which the new concept is immediately 
embedded, were also briefly discussed 
and followed by a definition of NestPs, il-
lustrated with four authentic examples. 
The relationship between NestPs, on 
the one hand, and informativeness and 
manipulation, on the other, was prob-
lematized, on pragmatic, Gricean and rel-
evance-theoretic grounds, leading to the 
conclusion that NestPs are inherently ma-
nipulative. A cognitive account was devel-
oped to explain the manipulative charac-
ter and behaviour of NestPs, in terms of the 
relevance-theoretic concepts of Ostensive 
Stimulus, Cognitive Principle of Relevance, 
Optimal Relevance, Comprehension Pro-
cedure, in addition to the newly suggested 
cognitive mechanisms of Cognitive Under-
passing and Structure-Content Cognitive 
Conflict.
The manipulative character and fun-
c tion of NestPs were therefore established 
in terms of propositional content, infor-
ma tion structures, packaging, cognitive 
me chanisms, and logical fallaciousness: 
NestPs carry new unsubstantiated propo-
sitional content, strategically arranged in 
a complex and convoluted order and cast 
in structures typically associated with the 
opposite kind of content, in order to delib-
erately hamper the proper cognitive pro-
cessing of the hearer. 
In conclusion, I borrow what Wilson 
and Sperber said about their well-devel-
oped theory: “Relevance Theory does not 
provide an absolute measure of mental 
effort or cognitive effect, and it does not 
assume that such a measure is available 
to the spontaneous workings of the mind” 
(2004: 278). The same can be very hum-
bly argued about NestPs. The research I 
attempted and discussed in this paper is 
certainly limited in scope and depth, and 
requires deeper and wider empirical and 
theoretical investigation, in order to soli-
dify the new concept of NestPs. A good 
starting point could be running empiri-
cal experiments to measure the speed of 
processing a single pragmatic presuppo-
sition and comparing it to that of process-
ing NestPs. Finally, presupposition “re-
mains […] still only partially understood, 
and an important ground for the study of 
how semantics and pragmatics interact” 
(Levinson 1983: 225). 
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